A sealed document, exactly as the server stores it
{ "version": "1.4", "doc_id": "01KZMFP6S6Q8HMENXM38ADNY9A", "created_at": 1786320198, "header": { "threshold": { "required": 2, "of_total": 3 }, "lifetime": { … }, "policy": { … }, "access_map": [ { "method": "ecdh-p256", "share_index": 1, "wrapped_cek": }, …2 more ], "payload_hash": }, "header_hash": , "payload": { "alg": "AES-256-GCM", "encoding": "base64+gzip+padme", "iv": , "ciphertext": } no "filename" no "mime_type" no "size" }
The filename isn't in here.
Neither is the file.
A .cell carries your document as ciphertext and little else. The name,
the file type and the true size are sealed inside the payload, not printed on
the envelope. Whoever stores this file cannot read any of them — and neither can we.
Encryption happens in your browser, before anything is sent. No install, no password and no plugin. Opening a file never asks you to sign in; sending one through us takes a one-click email confirmation.
The asymmetry
Confidential, and accountable
Almost every secure-file product makes both parties enrol in a portal, with passwords, before a file can move. Here nobody makes a password or installs anything, and each side gives up only what its part of the exchange needs.
The sender
Confirms an email. No password, no portal.
Look up a recipient, encrypt in your browser, send. Sending through us takes a one-click email sign-in, so that someone who sends malware or harassment can be stopped, and blocked by the people they target.
We record which account sent a file, never what is in it, and we never show it to the recipient. Rate limiting keeps no raw addresses, and the sender can choose to leave no local history of what was sent. To use no account at all, encrypt a file and pass it on yourself.
The recipient organization
Public on purpose, because that is the point
A law office, a newsroom tip line or a compliance desk being findable is the whole value. A verified listing — address, key, published fingerprint — reads like a bar number or a masthead.
Publishers sign in the same way, with a magic link, to manage their own listing: rename it, expire it, take it down. Opening a file sent to you needs no sign-in at all.
Said plainly, and no further: the server cannot read your document, and neither can we. That is end-to-end encryption. It is not anonymity, and we don't sell it as such.
What you can do with it
Delivery rules that survive the recipient
Require two people to open one document
Split access k-of-n: a wire instruction that opens only when the CFO and outside counsel are both present. Dual control on the document itself, not on the inbox it landed in.
The YubiKey is the key
Unlock with a hardware security key or the fingerprint reader already on the device. The secret is generated on the key and never leaves it, so there is nothing on our side to hand over or lose.
Retention terms, with the enforcement stated honestly
Disposal rules run on the operator's side and are genuinely enforced. Retention hints travel with the file as advisory — and the format says so in as many words, because nothing can be enforced against someone who already holds the key.
Rotate a key without breaking the chain
Re-sealing a document links the new envelope to the previous one by hash, so a file's history stays auditable across key rotations and staff changes.
Don't trust us
Every claim on this page is checkable
The format is published, the browser code is readable, and the specification is timestamped. We would rather be audited than believed.
The specification
The normative format spec, published as a defensive disclosure. No patent is asserted against it.
An independent verifier
A checker written from the spec alone, sharing no code with the product, so it can prove the product honest.
Bitcoin-anchored timestamps
The published spec bytes are anchored on-chain, so the version you read is the version we froze.